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I. INTRODUCTION
On January 22, 1973, the United States Supreme Court decided
the landmark case of Roe v. Wade.' In Roe, the Court held that
the right of privacy "is broad enough to encompass a woman's
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." 2 The Supreme
Court's legalization of abortion placed it at the center3 of the heated
and emotional debate that surrounds the American abortion con-
troversy.
4
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. Id. at 153.
3. Although the Supreme Court is the focus of the abortion debate in the United States, it
is by no means the only branch of government dealing with this issue. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood
v. Sullivan, 913 F.2d 1492, 1501 n.3 (10th Cir. 1990) (citing Tamar Lewin, Testing the Limits on
Abortion, N.Y. TImS, April 2, 1990, at A14) (discussing the states' legislative efforts to confront
abortion). A compilation of state abortion laws is found in ABORTION IN THE UNITrD STATEs: A
CoMPUATION OF STATE LEGISLATION (Howard A. Hood et al. eds., 1991) (a two volume work that
catalogs state abortion laws both by state and topic).
4. The highly contentious and divisive debate over abortion is easily understood, given the
1
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During the 1990-91 term, the Supreme Court was again con-
fronted with a case in which abortion played an integral role. This
case, however, also required the Court to decide questions of stat-
utory interpretation, administrative law, and free-speech rights. Ac-
cordingly, in Rust v. Sullivan,5 the Supreme Court had to address
two major issues:
(1) whether regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Health and Human Serv-
ices barring recipients of certain federal funds from discussing abortion with
their patients and requiring these recipients to be organized in a certain manner
were facially valid under Title X of the Public Health Service Act, and;
(2) if so, whether the regulations were permissible under the First and Fifth
Amendments to the United States Constitution.
6
By a sharply divided five to four vote, the Court held that the
regulations were both facially valid and constitutionally permissi-
ble. 7
This Comment will examine all the important aspects of the Rust
v. Sullivan case in order to facilitate the reader's understanding of
the confusing variety of questions Rust raised as well as the diverse
reasoning the Justices applied in answering them. First, it will re-
view the relevant parts of Title X of the Public Health Service Act.
positions taken by proponents on each side of the abortion dispute. Those who oppose abortion
consider it nothing less than the premeditated murder of an innocent life which paves the way for
a full-scale devaluation of humanity. Those who favor choice see abortion as an immediate and
beneficial option for women facing crisis pregnancies and hold that the governmental regulation of
abortion is an unjustifiable intrusion by the state into a woman's personal decision. 53 Fed. Reg.
2922 (1988).
For excellent background on the moral, social, historical, and legal issues that abortion raises,
see generally MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN VESTERN LAW (1987) (an examination
of laws and perceptions about abortion in the Western world); MICHAEL GROSSaERo, GOVERNING THE
HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMIY IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA (1985) (contains an excellent chapter
on abortion in the nineteenth century, a fundamentally important period in American abortion history);
KIusTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD (1984) (an excellent work discussing
the positions of opponents and supporters of abortion); JAMES C. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA: THE
ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL POLICY, 1800-1900 (1978) (a work of great value in the field
of abortion history); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES (1990) (a work written
by the petitioner's counsel in the Rust case that does a good job of covering all aspects of abortion
with particular emphasis on the law and abortion).
5. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
6. Id. at 1766-67.
7. Chief Justice Rehnquist, delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices White, Ken-
nedy, Scalia, and Souter joined. Justice Blackmun filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Marshall
joined and in which Justice O'Connor joined in Part I. Justice Stevens joined in Parts II and III.
Justices Stevens and O'Connor tiled dissenting opinions.
2
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Second, it will examine the regulations at issue in the case. Third,
it will exhaustively analyze the majority and dissenting opinions.
Fourth, it will discuss the Congressional response to the Rust case.
Finally, it will argue that the Court's decision in Rust was unsound
and deeply disturbing.
II. TITLE X OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE ACT
The Secretary promulgated the regulations at issue in Rust under
the authority of Title X. Therefore, an examination of the relevant
aspects of this legislation is crucial to an understanding of the Rust
case.
Title X authorizes the Secretary to "make grants to and enter
into contracts with public or nonprofit private entities to assist in
the establishment and operation of voluntary family planning pro-
jects which shall offer a broad range of acceptable and effective
family planning methods . . . ."9 These grants and contracts "shall
be made in accordance with such regulations as the Secretary may
promulgate."' 10 Section 1008 of the Public Health Service Act (Sec-
tion 1008) mandates that "[n]one of the funds appropriated under
this subchapter shall be used in programs where abortion is a method
of family planning."" Title X does not, however, define the term
"method of family planning."
A. Department of Health and Human Services Regulations
Before 1988
Prior to 1988, the rules governing Title X interpreted section
1008's prohibition on abortion as forbidding Title X institutions
from using Title X money to perform abortions or funding activities
8. 42 U.S.C. § 300a (1988).
9. Id. Title X provides federal money for nearly 4,000 family planning programs in the United
States. Every year these clinics provide family planning and medical services to more than 4.1 million
American women. 137 CONG. REc. S10,129 (daily ed. July 16, 1991) (statement of Sen. Levin). In
West Virginia, 71 Title X institutions provide family planning services to over 121,000 women. 137
CONG. REc. S10,192 (daily ed. July 17, 1991) (statement of Sen. Rockefeller).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-4(a) (1988).
11. Id. § 300a-6.
1991]
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that immediately promoted or encouraged abortion. 12 These regu-
lations also permitted, and later required, Title X institutions to
counsel their patients about their abortion option after the Title .X
clinic confirmed the pregnancy 13 or when the patient specifically
requested such information. 14 Further, these regulations allowed fund
recipients to operate abortion clinics provided they maintained sep-
arate accounts to assure that no Title X grantee was using Title X
funds to finance abortions.15 In 1987, the federal government began
a review of these regulations that eventually resulted in their de-
mise. 16
B. Department of Health and Human Services Regulations
After 1988
In 1987 President Ronald Reagan directed the Department of
Health and Human Services to establish new standards to assure
that Title X recipients understood and were respecting Section 1008's
ban on abortion as a means of family planning. 7 On February 2,
1988, the Secretary published these new regulations 8 which inter-
preted Section 1008 much more stringently than had the old reg-
ulations. 9
12. Carole I. Chervin, Note, The Title X Family Planning Gag Rule: Can the Government Buy
Up Constitutional Rights?, 41 STAN. L. REV. 401, 406 (1989).
13. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, PROGRAM GUIDELINES FOR PROJECT GRANTS
FOR FAamLY PLANNING SERVICES § 8.6 (1981) [hereinafter PROGRAM GUIDELINES].
14. Id.
15. Chervin, supra note 12, at 406.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. 53 Fed. Reg. 2922 (1988) (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 59 (1989)). Opponents of these regulations
referred to them as the "gag-rule" since they "gagged" doctors with respect to their ability to discuss
abortion with their patients. Major Garrett, Senate Rejects "Gag" on Abortion, VAsH. TIMEs, July
18, 1991, at A4. In order to distinguish these regulations from the prior regulations, this Comment
will refer to them as either the new regulations or the post-1988 regulations.
19. These new regulations were the subject of immense controversy almost from the day of
their inception. Compare Theodore C. Hirt, Why the Government is Not Required to Subsidize A bar-
tion Counseling and Referral, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1895 (1988) (supporting the new regulations under
the Congressional spending power) with Janet Benshoof, The Chastity Act: Government Manipulation
of Abortion Information and the First Amendment, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1916 (1988) (condemning
governmental manipulation of abortion information as a violation of the First Amendment, but within
the context of the Adolescent Family Life Act); C. Andrew McCarthy, Comment, The Prohibition
on Abortion Counseling and Referral in Federally-Funded Family Planning Clinics, 77 CALIF. L. REV.
1181 (1989) (also opposing the new regulations as violative of the First Amendment); Alexandra A.E.
Shapiro, Note, Title X, The Abortion Debate, and The First Amendment, 90 CoLum. L. REV. 1737
(1990) (finding the regulations a violation of the First Amendment).
[Vol. 94
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These new regulations required that Title X grantees abide by
several restrictions. First, the new regulations forbid Title X reci-
pients from providing counseling concerning the use of abortion as
a means of family planning or providing abortion referral as a means
of family planning. 20 Title X institutions must also refer all pregnant
patients to "appropriate prenatal and/or social services by fur-
nishing a list of appropriate providers that promote the welfare of
the mother and the unborn child." ' 21 This providers list may not be
utilized to indirectly promote or advocate abortion. Thus, the new
regulations specifically prohibit
weighing the list of referrals in favor of health care providers which perform
abortions, by including on the list of referral providers health care providers
whose principal business is the provision of abortions, by excluding available
providers who do not provide abortions, or by 'steering' clients to providers who
offer abortion as a means of family planning.2"
The regulations also forbid Title X institutions from discussing
abortion even upon the patient's specific request. 23
Second, the new regulations further prohibit Title X institutions
from participating in activities that "encourage, promote or ad-
vocate abortion as a method of family planning." 24 Among pro-
hibited activities are: (1) lobbying for laws that increase the
availability of abortion as a means of family planning; (2) procuring
speakers who promote abortion as a means of family planning; (3)
paying dues to groups which support abortion as a means of family
planning; or (4) using legal redress to make abortion available in
any way as a "means of family planning. ' 25 Finally, the regulations
require that Title X projects be organized so that they are "phys-
ically and financially separate" from forbidden activities .26 To be
deemed separate from forbidden activities, "a Title X project must
20. 42 C.F.R. § 59.8 (1989).
21. Id. § 59.8(a)(2).
22. Id. § 59.8(a)(3).
23. Id. § 59.8(b)(5). If a Title X patient requests abortion information, a Title X employee
may respond that "the project does not consider abortion an appropriate method of family planning
and therefore does not counsel or refer for abortion." Id.
24. Id. § 59.10(a).
25. Id.
26. Id. § 59.9.
1991]
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have an objective integrity and independence from prohibited ac-
tivities. Mere bookkeeping separation of Title X funds from other
monies is not sufficient.''27 Several nonexclusive factors that the
new regulations provide in order to determine if an "objective in-
tegrity" exists include: (1) the existence of separate accounting re-
cords and personnel; (2) the degree of physical separation between
Title X facilities and facilities which conduct forbidden activities;
(3) the extent to which signs and identifications of the Title X pro-
ject are present; and (4) the extent to which signs and materials
promoting abortion are absent.28
These new regulations angered a large number of Title X re-
cipients, family planning organizations, and medical groups. Con-
sequently, widespread opposition to the new regulations arose.29 This
extensive opposition lead directly to the Rust v. Sullivan case.3 0
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 1970 Congress passed Title X of the Public Health Service
Act (Title X).31 This legislation authorizes federal funding for public
and private non-profit family planning services. 32 Title X empowers
the Secretary of Health and Human Services to administer this pro-
gram by promulgating the regulations governing the awarding of
these funds. 33 Title X provides, however, that no funds appropriated




29. Lee May, Groups Assail Rules on Abortion Advice, Los ANGELES TimEs, Feb. 3, 1988, at
4.
30. Id.
31. Title X of the Public Health Service Act is officially Subchapter VIII of the Public Health
and Welfare laws, popularly named the Family Planning Services and Population Research Act, Pub.
L. No. 91-572, 84 Stat. 1504 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300-300a-8 (1988)). It is commonly
referred to as Title X because of its designation as Title X of chapter 373 of Public Law No. 91-
572. New York v. Bowen, 690 F. Supp. 1261, 1262 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd sub noin. New York
v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1989), aff'd sub nom. Rust v. Sullivan, Ill S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 300a (1988).
33. Id.
34. Id. § 300a-6.
[Vol. 94
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In 1988 the Secretary of Health and Human Services promul-
gated new regulations that severely restricted the ability of Title X
funded institutions35 to discuss the abortion option with their pa-
tients.3 6 This change represented a marked departure from the pre-
vious regulations that, with some minor alterations, had been in
force since the early 1970's .3 The old regulations interpreted Title
X's ban on abortion as a method of family planning as only pro-
hibiting Title X institutions from performing abortions.38 Moreover,
unlike the new regulations, the old regulations allowed, and later
actually required, Title X recipients to provide nondirective coun-
seling to their patients who tested positive for pregnancy on all legal
options including abortion. 39
Before the new regulations could take effect, Dr. Irving Rust,
a supervisor at a private Title X institution in New York, and a
number of New York State and City agencies that receive Title X
funds (petitioners) brought two separate actions against the Sec-
retary of Health and Human Services (Secretary). These actions,
that were later consolidated, challenged the new regulations' facial
validity under Title X and their permissibility under both the First
and Fifth Amendments.
4 0
The District Court for the Southern District of New York issued
a temporary injunction against the regulations, but then rejected
petitioners' challenges and granted the Secretary's motion for sum-
mary judgment. 41 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit af-
35. For the purposes of this Comment, Title X institutions, Title X grantees, and Title X
recipients are all used interchangeably to refer to any entity receiving monies under the authority of
Title X.
36. 42 C.F.R. § 59 (1989).
37. 42 C.F.R. § 59 (1972).
38. Id. § 59.5(a)(9).
39. See PRoGRAM GuIDELIMNS, supra note 13.
40. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1766 (1991).
41. New York v. Bowen, 690 F. Supp. 1261, 1274 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). However, the cases of
Massachusetts v. Bowen, 679 F. Supp. 137 (D. Mass. 1988), aff'd sub nom. Massachusetts v. Secretary
of Health and Human Services, 899 F.2d 53 (en banc) (1st Cir. 1990) and Planned Parenthood Fed'n
of Am. v. Bowen, 687 F. Supp. 540 (D. Colo. 1988), aff'd sub nom. Planned Parenthood Fed'n of
Am. v. Sullivan, 913 F.2d 1492 (10th Cir. 1990) invalidated the new regulations on primarily con-
stitutional grounds. The case of West Virginia Ass'n of Community Health Centers, Inc. v. Sullivan,
737 F. Supp. 929 (S.D. W. Va. 1990) invalidated only those regulations which interfered with the
physician's ability to freely discuss all legal and medical options with her patients.
1991]
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firmed the lower court's decision. 42 After granting the petitioners'
request for certiorari, 43 the United States Supreme Court affirmed
the Circuit Court's ruling.44
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE HOLDING
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist began the de-
cision by examining the pertinent sections of Title X. 45 The Chief
Justice then reviewed the post-1988 regulations at issue in the case. 46
After completing his inspection of the statute and regulations, he
proceeded to summarize the Second Circuit opinion which upheld
the post-1988 regulations.47 The Chief Justice used his summary of
the lower court's decision to frame the issues of statutory analysis
and constitutional scrutiny that his opinion would address. 48 He
began his inquiry into the permissibility of the new regulations (and
foreshadowed the ultimate decision in the case) by quoting from
United States v. Salerno:
A facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge
to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circum-
stances exists under which the Act would be valid. The fact that the [regulations]
might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is
insufficient to render [them] wholly invalid.
4 9
A. The Regulations' Facial Validity Under Title X
In determining the facial validity of the regulations, the Chief
Justice first observed that the language of Title X is ambiguous
with regard to Section 1008's prohibition on abortion as a method
of family planning. 50 He noted that Title X does not directly address
42. New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 401, 414 (2d Cir. 1989).
43. Rust v. Sullivan, 110 S. Ct. 2559 (1990). The Supreme Court considered the validity of
the new regulations through Rust because the petitioners in Rust were the first to file the paperwork
to request a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court.
44. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1778.
45. Id. at 1764-65. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
46. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1765-66 (1991). See supra notes 31.40 and accompanying
text.
47. Id. at 1766-67.
48. Id. at 1767.
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the issues of counseling, referral, advocacy, and program integrity
at issue in the case.5 1 Because of the absence of this information,
he applied the test the Supreme Court set forth in Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 52 This test states
that when a statute is ambiguous or silent on a specific issue the
Court must determine if the agency's interpretation of the statute
is permissible. 3 A court may only invalidate an agency's interpre-
tation of a statute as being impermissible when this interpretation
clearly clashes with Congressional intent or when it does not rep-
resent a plausible construction of the statute.5 4 Rehnquist further
noted that a court usually accords an agency charged with the in-
terpretation of an authorizing statute "substantial deference.
'55
In applying the Chevron test, the Chief Justice found that Title
X's own broad language supports the Secretary's interpretation of
it.56 Although Title X does not specifically define the term "method
of family planning" or list what types of services are entitled to
funding, it does specifically bar abortion as a means of family plan-
ning. Thus, the Court held that the Secretary's interpretation of
Title X was permissible. 7 He further stated that the conflicting and
highly generalized statements in the legislative history of Title X
made it an unavailing avenue by which to arrive at a clearly de-
monstrable Congressional intent for enacting Title X.
58
He also rejected the petitioners' argument that the district court
should not have paid the new regulations such traditional deference
because the new regulations represented a reversal of a prior and
long-standing agency interpretation.5 9 Chief Justice Rehnquist noted
that the Court rejected such an argument in Chevron.60 He cited
51. Id.
52. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
53. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1767 (1991) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43).
54. Id.
55. Id. (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844).
56. Id. at 1768.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1768-69.
60. Id. at 1769 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 862 (1984)).
1991]
9
Johnson: Rust v. Sullivan: The Supreme Court Upholds the Title X Abortion-
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1991
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW
several cases to support the proposition that an agency must con-
tinually reevaluate its policies to meet the challenges of continually
changing circumstances. 61 He also found that the Secretary amply
justified his altered interpretation of section 1008 with a "reasoned
analysis." 6 2 The Secretary changed his interpretation of Title X in
the wake of reports written by the Office of the Inspector General
and the General Accounting Office. These reports found that the
old regulations had failed to properly implement Title X and that
new and clear operative guidance was necessary to preserve the dis-
tinction between Title X institutions and institutions which use abor-
tion as a method of family planning.63 The Secretary also determined
that the new regulations were more in keeping with the original
spirit of Title XA4 The changes were also justified both because of
negative patient experience under the old regulations 6 and a shift
in public opinion "against the elimination of unborn children by
abortion.'"66
The Secretary's reliance on this last point is debatable at best.
A Wirthlin Group poll conducted after the Rust decision found that
public opinion was split over the Court's decision.67 After the res-
pondents in this poll were told that money from banned clinics
would go to other clinics that stress pregnancy prevention, sixty-
nine percent voiced approval of the Court's decision .6  However,
a Harris poll found just the opposite result.69 Over three-fourths
61. Id. (citing NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775 (1990); Motor Vehicles
Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (quoting Permian
Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968)).
62. Id. (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983)). The full context of the quote is "an agency changing its course by rescinding
a rule is obligated to supply a reasoned analysis for the change beyond that which may be required





67. Joyce Price, Foley Admits Veto ofAbortion Bill Could Be "Impossible to Override," WAsh.
TIMEs, June 25, 1991, at Al.
68. Id.
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of those who responded to the Harris poll favored passage of leg-
islation allowing abortion discussion to occur at Title X institu-
tions .70
The opinion then turned to the "program integrity" requirement
of the new regulations. 7' The Chief Justice held that the legislative
history of Title X is extremely ambiguous; therefore, he rejected
the petitioners' argument that the new regulations frustrate a Con-
gressional intent to provide an integrated and comprehensive health
care system. 72 He noted that the only thing clear from Title X's
history is the Congressional desire that Title X programs be separate
from abortion activities. 73 The Chief Justice failed to recognize that
Congress passed and subsequently re-funded the Title X program
six times under the old regulations. 74 Congress had also consistently
voted down all attempts to legislatively alter the old regulations. 75
Indeed, after the promulgation of the new regulations, the Senate
took up legislation specifically designed to codify the old regula-
70. Id.
71. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1769 (1991).
72. Id. However, note the recent statement by Senator Hollings:
Mr. President, when I have voted to pass a law creating a health promotion program ...
I have not intended to provide second-class services .... I have not intended to exacerbate
the balkanization of our health care system. Yet, those are the ends to which the current
[Supreme] Court has bent my votes.
137 CONG. Rc. S10,195 (daily ed. July 17, 1991).
73. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1770.
74. Massachusetts v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 899 F.2d 53, 60 n.3 (1st Cir.
1990) (en banc) (citing amicus curiae brief of Rep. Patricia Schroder).
75. Id. at 61 n.4 (citing Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Bowen, 680 F. Supp. 1465, 1472
(D. Colo.) (granting a temporary injunction against the new regulations), aff'd, 687 F. Supp. 540
(D. Colo. 1988) (granting a permanent injunction against the new regulations on petitioners' motion
for summary judgment), aff'd sub nom. Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Sullivan 913 F.2d
1492 (10th Cir. 1990)). See also 137 CONG. REc. S10,196 (daily ed. July 17, 1991) (statement of Sen.
Glenn) ("Time and again efforts to legislate a gag rule have been voted down by Congress."). A
number of Senators and Representatives took the position in the Congressional debates to alter the
Rust decision that the Congress had taken no steps to alter the old regulations because the Con-
gressional intent in passing Title X was being fully carried out under them. See, e.g., 137 CONG. REC.
S10,196 (daily ed. July 17, 1991) (statement of Sen. Glenn) ("The HHS regulations and the Supreme
Court's decision clearly misread the Congressional intent behind Title X."); 137 CONG. REc. S10,077
(daily ed. July 16, 1991) (statement of Sen. Packwood) ("I think Congress fully understood what we
intended [in passing Title X] .... That was the family planning clinic could say to a woman, you
can carry the baby to term, [and] put it up for adoption ... [or] keep it. You [also] have the right
to [an] abortion. We thought that is what the law meant because if we did not think that is what
it meant we would change it."); 137 CONG. REc. H5126 (daily ed. June 26, 1991) (statement of Rep.
Gephardt) ("The Supreme Court has misinterpreted federal law .. ").
1991]
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tions.76 Despite this evidence of Congressional support of the old
regulations, the Court yielded to the Secretary's judgment that the
"program integrity" requirement is necessary to implement Con-
gressional intent. 77
B. Constitutional Challenges to the Regulations
Having disposed of the petitioners' challenges to the facial va-
lidity of the new regulations under Title X, the Chief Justice ad-
dressed the new regulations' constitutional permissibility.78 Because
76. On September 25, 1990 (after the Secretary had promulgated the new regulations), the Senate
voted 62 to 36 to alter the new regulations by codifying the old regulations through legislative action.
136 CONG. REc. S13,792 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1990) (roll call vote on the Chafee amendment). This
amendment, however, died when the Senate did not take action on the underlying bill to which the
leadership attached this amendment. 137 CONG. REc. S10,072 (daily ed. July 16, 1991) (statement of
Sen. Chafee).
77. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1770-71 (1991).
78. Id. at 1771. Although unclear in his approach to this issue, it appears that in finding the
new regulations constitutional the Chief Justice also meant to respond to the petitioner's argument
that the regulations are of such dubious constitutionality that Congress could not have intended their
promulgation. While the Chief Justice did state that this argument had some merit, he held that they
did not "carry the day." Id.
Rehnquist appears to be concerned with avoiding the questions that the case of Kent v. Dulles,
357 U.S. 116 (1958), and its progeny, implicitly raise in Rust. In Kent the Supreme Court examined
the validity of regulations the Secretary of State promulgated under statutory authority relating to
the issuing of passports to American nationals. The Secretary's regulations denied passports to com-
munists or to persons who would use them to further the communist movement. Kent challenged
these regulations. In an opinion written by Justice Douglas, the Supreme Court held that the right
to leave the United States was a personal right included within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment's
guarantee of "liberty." Id. at 129. The Court held that when the Congress delegates to an agency
the authority to regulate that right, the Court will narrowly construe all the delegated powers that
dilute or curtail that right. Id. The Court hesitated to "find in this broad generalized power [that
the Congress gave to the Secretary of State] an authority to trench so heavily upon the rights of the
citizen." Id. If the Court had held the regulations facially permissible, the Court would have been
faced with important constitutional questions. Id. at 130. Thus, absent specific Congressional pro-
visions allowing the Secretary of State to issue these regulations, the Court held the regulations sta-
tutorily unauthorized. Id.; see also National Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336
(1974) (following the Kent approach). But see Halg v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 310 (1981) (Blackmun,
J., concurring) (arguing for the Court to overrule Kent).
In Rust it appears that Rehnquist successfully sidestepped this line of cases. Apparently, he
reasoned, if there was no doubt as to the new regulations' constitutionality, then no problem existed
in regard to Congressional intent. If so, Rehnquist missed one of the major points of Kent, which
was to assure that it would be the politically accountable Congress, and not the unelected Courts
and agencies, which would be making policy, as compared to legal, determinations. Cf. JERtY L.
MAsHAW & RIcHARD A. MERRILL, INTRODUCTION To THE AMERIcAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM 209 (1975)
(identifying that the Kent v. Dulles approach to delegation is similar to the type of approach that
courts apply to legislation when fundamental rights are involved). But see Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984) (arguing that agencies are po-
litically accountable, albeit indirectly, through the President). See generally JAMES 0. FREEDMAN, CRISIS
AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRocEss AND AMERicAN GOVERNMENT 82-83 (1978).
[Vol. 94
12
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 94, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 9
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol94/iss1/9
ABORTION COUNSELING
a Supreme Court decision to invalidate an act of Congress 'is the
gravest and most delicate duty that the Court is called on to per-
form.' ' 79 Rehnquist noted that, when a case compels the Court to
pass upon the constitutionality of an act of Congress, well estab-
lished canons of construction 8° require the Court to strive to find
an interpretation of a statute under which the statute would be
constitutional.8 The Chief Justice also noted that the corollary to
this doctrine requires the Court to not only uphold a statute, but
to do so in a manner that avoids casting serious doubt upon that
constitutionality, 82 since the Court assumes the Congress legislates
within the light of constitutional limitations. 83 Applying the canon
of construction he thus laid out, the Chief Justice found that the
regulations do not raise the type of "'grave and doubtful consti-
tutional questions' that would convince the Court that Congress
did not intend to authorize their promulgation.84
The first constitutional issue that the majority dealt with was
the petitioners' argument that the new regulations violated the First
Amendment. 85 The petitioners argued that the new regulations dis-
criminated based on viewpoint because they prohibited all discussion
about abortion in Title X institutions, but required these institutions
to provide information about carrying a pregnancy to term.86 In so
doing, the regulations invidiously discriminate on the basis of view-
point. The petitioners also argued that the new regulations are con-
stitutionally impermissible since the government may not subsidize
programs in a manner that is aimed at the suppression of ideas.87
Rehnquist rejected both of these arguments.88
The Chief Justice stated that the regulations do not violate the
First Amendment by discriminating based on viewvpoint. 89 Rehnquist




83. Id. (citing FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298 (1924)).
84. Id. (quoting United States v. Delaware and Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909)).
85. Id. at 1771-72.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1772.
88. Id. at 1772-76.
89. Id. at 1772-73.
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observed that the government may legitimately opt to effectuate a
value judgment by subsidizing one program to the exclusion of op-
posite programs.90 By providing these subsidies, the government has
not discriminated based on viewpoint; it has simply elected to sup-
port one option to the exclusion of other, competing options. 91 The
new regulations, held the Chief Justice, are a perfectly reasonable
vehicle for assuring that recipients of Title X funds do not partic-
ipate in activities outside the scope of the Title X program. 92
A discussion then ensued over the argument that the new re-
gulations are impermissible since they require a Title X patient to
surrender her free-speech rights in order to receive the benefit of
Title X assistance. 93 The Chief Justice dismissed this approach be-
cause the new regulations do not deny government benefits to any-
one: they merely require that recipients of Congressionally allocated
funds use those funds in the manner Congress intended. 4 The new
regulations do not force Title X institutions to relinquish speech
relating to abortion.95 The new regulations only seek to keep such
discussion "separate and distinct from Title X activities. "96 Rehn-
quist distinguished FCC v. League of Women Voters97 from the
present case since, in League of Women Voters, the governmental
regulations the Court struck down would have prohibited recipients
of governmental funds from exercising their free-speech rights out-
side the scope of their governmental funding. 98 He also found sup-
port for this proposition in Regan v. Taxation with Representation.99
In Regan the Court held that the Congressional spending power
allows the Congress to refuse to subsidize lobbying activities of tax-
exempt organizations by forbidding them from utilizing tax-de-
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1772.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1773-74.
94. Id. at 1774.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. 468 U.S. 364 (1984) (holding Congress may not prohibit editorializing by public television
and radio stations receiving public funds).
98. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1774 (1991).
99. 461 U.S. 540 (1983) (holding Congress may use tax money to allow some organizations,
but not others, to lobby at taxpayer expense).
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ductible contributions to support their lobbying. 100 Thus, the Chief
Justice found that the First Amendment does not bar the regulations
at issue in Rust since they do not deny Title X recipients the right
to discuss abortion. 10 They only require Title X institutions to spend
Title X money in a manner Congress intended. 0 2
The Chief Justice also found such free-speech reasoning equally
applicable to employees of Title X institutions. °10 When one chooses
to accept employment at a Title X institution, one must accept all
the restrictions that come with the job. 10 4 The restrictions on em-
ployees' free-speech rights are limited, of course, only to the period
when actually engaged, in their employment. 05 Such restrictions,
however, are a direct result of the individual's choice to accept
employment at a governmental funded project whose scope is per-
missibly limited by the authorizing authority.
10 6
The last First Amendment issue the Rust case addressed was the
impact of the new regulations on the doctor-patient relationship.
0 7
Rehnquist determined that the new regulations did not significantly
impact upon the doctor-patient relationship: 18 the doctor-patient
relationship a Title X program establishes is not so all-encompassing
as to evince on the part of a Title X patient the belief she is receiving
comprehensive medical advice. 0 9 Since the Title X program does
not provide any postconception services to its patients, it is unrea-
sonable to think that a patient could believe that a Title X physician
does not consider abortion an appropriate option for her." 0 Fur-
100. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1774-75.
101. Id. at 1777.




106. Id. For a discussion of the interaction between government employment and the Constitution
in a nonfunding context, see generally Mary E. Lathers, Comment, Do You Abandon All Consti-
tutional Protections by Accepting Employment with the Government?: Mandatory Drug Testing of
Government Employees Violates the Fourth Amendment, 28 SANTA CLARA L. Ray. 169 (1988).
107. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1775-76 (1991).
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thermore, the Title X physician is always free to explain that abor-
tion advice is outside the scope of the Title X program."'
Rehnquist's reasoning here is flawed in a number of ways. The
new regulations at issue in Rust allow Title X clinics to conduct
general physical examinations, test for breast cancer, and treat both
sexually transmitted diseases and gynecological problems. 112 Further,
a woman who seeks the assistance of a Title X physician has every
right to believe that her Title X physician will not withhold ap-
plicable medical advice regarding the very circumstances which have
compelled her visit:"' to consider otherwise is to engage in "un-
informed fantasy." 11
4
The Chief Justice then proceeded to an examination of the per-
missibility of the new regulations under a woman's Fifth Amend-
ment right to terminate her pregnancy." 5 Rehnquist found that the
government has no affirmative duty to fund an activity merely be-
cause that activity is constitutionally protected." 6 In refusing to fund
abortions, Congress has placed no governmental obstacle in the path
of a woman seeking an abortion." 7 Chief Justice Rehnquist ob-
served that a long line of Supreme Court cases have led to the
doctrine that the government's failure to fund abortions leaves in-
digent women with the same range of options available to them if
the government had elected not to fund any health care at all." 8
The petitioners then argued that the Supreme Court's decisions
in Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. "9 and
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1782 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 1782 n.3 (Blackmun. J., dissenting).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1776.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1776-77 (citing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 315 (1980)) (Congress has no duty
to provide funding for abortions through the medicaid program even when these abortions are med-
ically necessary).
118. Id. (citing Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989)).
119. 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (holding regulations requiring physicians to repeat to patients a litany
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Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecol-
ogists120 forbid governmental interference with a woman's right to
make a fully voluntary and informed choice on abortion through
the creation of restrictions within the doctor-patient dialogue.1 21 The
Chief Justice distinguished these two cases by noting that in both
Akron and Thornburgh the governmental intrusion into the doctor-
patient relationship was absolute.122 In both cases, the government
required the doctor to provide certain information to the patient
regardless of whether the patient requested the information or
whether the doctor considered the transmission of the information
to the patient medically necessary. 2 3 Rehnquist differentiated the
regulations at issue in Akron and Thornburgh from those at issue
in Rust, because the regulations at issue in Rust were not so totally
pervasive as those in Akron and Thornburgh.2 4 The new regulations
do not deny a doctor the ability to discuss abortion with a patient;
they only require that such discussion occur outside the environs
of the Title X institution.
2 5
Rehnquist paid little heed to the petitioners' argument that this
approach is unrealistic, since most Title X patients are too poor to
secure such outside medical assistance. 2 6 The Chief Justice held that
these Title X patients would still be in no worse a position than if
the Congress had chosen not to fund any health care programs at
all. 2 7 Therefore, it is the patient's indigence, rather than a gov-
120. 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (holding regulations similar to those in Akron are also constitutionally
impermissible).





126. Id. Title X programs have specifically targeted their services towards 14.5 million poor
women who run the risk of unintended pregnancy everyday. (Even though Title X still only reaches
about 4.1 million American women annually, 137 CONG. REc. S10,129, supra note 9, most com-
mentators still consider it to be a successful program. See 136 CONG. REc. S13,781 (daily ed., Sep-
tember 25, 1990) (statement of Sen. Chafee)). All of these targeted women have incomes 150 percent
below the poverty level. New York v. Sullivan, 899 F.2d 401, 415 n.1 (2d Cir. 1989) (Cardamone,
J., concurring) (citing Carole I. Chervin, Note, The Title X Family Planning Gag-Rule: Can the
Government Buy Up Constitutional Rights?, 41 STAN. L. REv. 401, 408 (1989)). Most of these targeted
women also lack the education to read beyond the fifth grade level. Lewis H. Lapham, Tyromancy,
HARPER'S, Aug. 1991, at 6.
127. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1778 (1991).
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ernmental policy, that precludes her from obtaining an abortion. 28
C. The Dissenting Opinions
In the final analysis, however, it is the dissenting opinions which
are actually the most well-conceived and articulated. Justice Black-
mun wrote the most persuasive of these dissents. Justices Stevens
and O'Connor both joined in parts of Blackmun's dissent as well
as authoring their own opinions. 129 Since all four dissenting Justices
agreed with most of Justice Blackmun's ideas, this Comment will
concentrate only on his opinion.
The dissent began its opinion by challenging the interpretation
of the canon of statutory construction the Chief Justice enunci-
ated. 130 Blackmun correctly stated that the duty of the Supreme
Court not to unnecessarily pass upon important constitutional ques-
tions is strongest when statutory language appears ambiguous.
3'
Blackmun astutely observed that if Congress desires to push the
limits of the constitutionality of its enactments, it would make that
intention clear in certain and unambiguous terms. 13 2 This argument
is the best either side presented in the Rust case. Its logic is emi-
nently sound and inescapable. When Congress passes legislation, it
is initiating some public policy. 133 It usually does not wish the ju-
128. Id.
129. Justice Blackmun authored a dissenting opinion in which Justice Marshall joined. Justice
Stevens wrote separately to argue that a closer study of Title X's wording and history would result
in the conclusion that Title X only prohibits recipients from performing abortions and does not prohibit
discussion of any legal options available to Title X patients. He joined Parts II and III of Blackmun's
dissent (the Constitutional questions) because he agreed with Blackmun that the majority's reasoning
warranted a challenge. Justice O'Connor wrote a separate opinion to emphasize that the regulations
raise serious constitutional questions that should lead the Court to invalidate the new regulations on
the grounds that they are not a reasonable interpretation of Title X. The Congress would still be
free to push the issue if it was so inclined. She joined Part I of Blackmun's opinion (the statutory
authorization question), but she declined to join Parts II and III because a finding that the regulations
were facially invalid would render these issues moot.
130. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1778.
131. Id. at 1779.
132. Id. at 1779-80. (quoting Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90
CoLtm. L. Rav. 2071, 2113 (1990)).
133. See generally CHRISTOPHER H. FoRANw, JR., SIGNALS FROM THE HILL: CONGRESSIONAL
OVERsIGHT AND THE CHALLENGE OF SOCIAL REGULATION 14-16 (1988); MICHAEL L. MEzEY, CONGRESS,
THE PRESIDENT AND PUBLIC POLICY 28 (1989) ("[O]nce it was decided that a national government
with significant policy-making authority would be established, there was never any question that the
national legislature would play a central role in exercising that authority.").
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dicial system to strike that legislation down (and with it, all the
legislative time, effort, and energy Congress invested in its pas-
sage),134 As such, the Congress normally keeps its enactments well
within the parameters of the Constitution so no doubt can possibly
exist over its intent. 135 On occasions, however, Congress may find
it necessary to pass legislation that does push the outer boundaries
of constitutionality. In this situation, Congress anticipates judicial
challenges will arise.
136
In order to facilitate a court's scrutiny of the legislation in ques-
tion vis-a-vis Congressional intent, Congress will specifically express
its desire to stretch its enactments to the furthest reaches of the
Constitution. In this way, Congress will not have to retread the
same legislative ground twice by passing a second act that more
clearly defines Congressional intent. The Congress will know in the
first instance whether its act was constitutional.
137
Another strong policy consideration buttresses Blackmun's con-
tention. Congress, as the people's representative institution, is di-
rectly responsible to the electorate.' 3  The voters, as well as the
courts, pass judgment upon its actions. 39 When a court allows an
agency to implement constitutionally suspect regulations, the court
permits a faceless, autonomous bureaucrat to annex Congressional
134. Cf. Charles 0. Jones, Congress and the Constitutional Balance of Power, in CONGRESSIONAL
POLITICS, 330-33 (Christopher J. Deering ed., 1989) (identifying that Congress normally has a number
of avenues open to it to nullify a Supreme Court decision that invalidates one of its acts).
135. Id.
136. Cf. FREEDMAN, supra note 78, at 84 (within the context of examining the non-delegation
doctrine, which states that there exists some point beyond which Congress may not delegate its au-
thority to other institutions, Freedman observes, "[The non-delegation doctrine] serves the ... purpose
of preventing congressional abdication of responsibility - in this case the responsibility of the leg-
islature in a constitutional system such as ours for presenting ultimate questions of legality to the
courts only when searching deliberation and thoughtful exploration of the alternatives has presented
none that is acceptable and of less constitutional moment.").
137. Id.
138. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 52 (James Madison); JAms R. BOWERS, REGULATING
THE REGULATORS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT OF ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING
10 (1990) (discussing the problem of accountability of popularly elected branches of government with
bureaucracies in the context of the people's consent to be governed).
139. See BoWERs, supra note 138; Cf. FREEDMAN, supra note 78, at 50-51 (discussing the role
that popular elections play in the establishment and execution of public policy).
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powers without giving the American people any recourse against
this agency's unauthorized usurpation of the legislative function.
4 0
Such being the case, Blackmun argued that the Court should not
have decided the constitutional issues that Rust presented because
the Supreme Court's canons of construction required the Court to
find that Title X did not authorize the regulations in question. 14
Further, according to Blackmun, the majority opinion ignores
reality in holding that the new regulations do not raise "serious
constitutional questions.' 1 42 He argued that the Court would have
been on much firmer constitutional ground if it had read Section
1008 as prohibiting Title X grantees from actually performing abor-
tions. 143 This approach would have placed Section 1008 clearly within
the purview of abortion restrictions the Court upheld in Maher v.
Roe'44 and Harris v. McRae. 45 In finding the regulations permissible
under Title X, however, the Court forced an unnecessary inquiry
into the constitutionality of Title X itself. 46 For this reason, Black-
mun also felt obliged to refute the majority opinion in respect to
the constitutional issues this case raised. 147
Blackmun effectively refuted the majority's claim that these reg-
ulations do not violate the First Amendment. The government is
clearly aiming to suppress what it considers a "dangerous idea"
when it requires that Title X institutions refuse to answer a patient's
inquiries about abortion and prohibit Title X recipients from par-
ticipating in activities advocating abortion.' 4
140. See FREEDMAN, supra note 78, at 80 ("Controverted issues of public policy are properly
decided, as nearly as effective political and institutional arrangements will permit, in forums closest
to the sources of popular representation."); See also Gary C. Bryner and Dennis L. Thompson,
Introduction to TiE CoNsTItToN AND Tm REGULATION OF SociETY 2 (Gary C. Bryner and Dennis
L. Thompson eds. 1988) ("The discretionary authority of regulatory bureaucracies appears to violate
the rule of law, individual rights, and other values that are at the heart of constitutional government.").
141. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1780 (1991).
142. Id. at 1778.
143. Id. at 1779 n.l.
144. 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (holding Congress has no duty to fund non-therapeutic abortions since
Roe v. Wade only requires the government refrain from unduly interfering with a woman's right to
an abortion).
145. 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (holding the government has no duty to fund abortions even when
medically necessary).
146. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1780 (1991).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1781.
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The dissent next assaulted the majority's reasoning by addressing
the regulation's effect on the free speech rights of Title X em-
ployees. 149 It cited Abood v. Detroit Board of Education150 and Ran-
kin v. McPherson1 5' to support its contention that restrictions on
free-speech are as constitutionally offensive in the workplace as they
are on main street.152 At the very least, that the communication
under investigation occurred in a work environment requires the
court to balance the speaker's interest in having his message heard
against the government's interest in having that message sup-
pressed. 5 3
Blackmun then applied the test he thus created to the Rust case.
5 4
He found that the interest in a physician in getting her message
across to a patient is highly compelling both because it is of in-
dispensable assistance to a patient in deciding what treatments to
undergo as well as fulfilling the physician's ethical duty. 55 The gov-
ernment's interest in distorting this information is to assure that
no Title X funds are being spent outside the scope of the program.
Blackmun found this interest falls woefully short of that necessary
to suppress the frank and full exchange of information relating to
a constitutionally protected right. 156 He argued that less-restrictive
alternatives can prevent Title X funds from being misspent. 157 The
149. Id. at 1782.
150. 431 U.S. 209 (1977) (holding state compelled speech as a condition of public employment
is impermissible even when the state does not regulate an employee's speech outside the workplace).
151. 483 U.S. 378 (1987) (holding the state may not discharge an employee for making comments
in the workplace that are of public concern).
152. Rust v. Sullivan, I11 S. Ct. 1759, 1783 (1991).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. (quoting THE COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL
ASSOCIATION, CURRENT OPINIONS 8.08 (1989)) (also citing the PRESIDENT'S COmIssIoN FOR THE STUDY
OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH
CARE DECISIONS 70 (1982); AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS & GNECOLOGISTS, STANDARDS FOR
OBsTETic-GYNECOLOGICAL SERVICES 62 (7th ed. 1989)). Currently over 50 organizations are on record
supporting the removal of the new regulation's restrictions on abortion counseling and referral in
Title X institutions. Prominent among these groups are a large number of medical and health care
professional organizations such as the American Medical Association, the American College of Phy-
sicians and the American Public Health Association. 137 CONG. REc. H5121 (daily ed. June 26, 1991)
(the list of opponents was entered in the Congressional Record by Rep. Meyers).
156. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1783.
157. Id. at 1783-84.
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government, for example, could impose strict bookkeeping stan-
dards to preserve financial separation between permissible and pro-
hibited activities ,158 or it could adopt content-neutral rules for the
balanced distribution of health and family planning information.5 9
The most impassioned attack on the majority opinion occurred
when Blackmun explained how the new regulations impede the doc-
tor-patient relationship.160 Blackmun thoroughly rejected the majority
opinion that the new regulations do not infringe on the doctor-
patient relationship.' 6' He argued the regulations in question un-
deniably have an effect on this relationship because they manipulate
the very words doctors may exchange with patients. 62 Such regu-
lation is unconscionable given the special significance that American
society places on this relationship. 6 Because of the importance of
this special association, Blackmun noted that the Court had taken
extreme pains to protect it up to this case.' 64 He argued that the
majority's imprimatur upon the new regulations at issue in this case
flies directly in the face of the Supreme Court's oft- repeated warn-
ings against regulations that tend to 'confine the . . . physician
in an undesired . .. straight jacket' which the profession cannot
endure.' 61
Lastly, Blackmun condemned these regulations because they are
designed to dissuade women from undergoing abortions. 66 He cor-
rectly identified that each of us places an immense amount of faith
in our doctor. The doctor-patient relationship is not just about the
prescription of treatment and medication, but the whole experience
of help, assistance, guidance, and emotional support we seek from
our health care providers when we are ill or injured. 67 In barring
Title X funded physicians from discussing abortion with their pa-
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1784.





165. Id. at 1786 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 n.8 (1976)).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1785.
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tients, the regulations in question are clearly a governmental en-
deavor to enlist physicians in an illicit program designed "'to deter
a woman from making a decision that, with her physician, is hers
to make."'11 68
V. CONGREssIoNAL RESPONSE TO RUST V. SULLIVAN
The Congressional response to the Rust decision was swift and
forceful. Both the House of Representatives and the Senate took
immediate steps to overturn the Court's opinion.
On June 26, 1991, the House of Representatives overwhelmingly
passed 69 the Department of Health and Human Services Appro-
priation Act (H.R. 2707).170 As a stop-gap measure designed to gain
more time for anti-Rust forces in the House to pass permanent
legislation overturning Rust, H.R. 2707 included a section 514 which
denies funding to the Secretary to enforce the new regulations ban
on abortion counseling upheld by the Supreme Court in Rust.'
7 1
The House Energy and Commerce Committee has also approved 72
a bill 73 that would codify the pre-1988 regulations' interpretation
of Title X.174 The Senate responded to Rust by first passing175 the
Title X Pregnancy Counseling Act of 1991 (S. 323)176 which codifies
168. Id. at 1786 (quoting Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,
476 U.S. 747, 759 (1986)).
169. 137 CONG. REc. H5131 (daily ed. June 26, 1991) (roll call vote). The overwhelming support
this legislation garnered in the House was due in no small part to the fact that a large number of
professional organizations opposed the new regulations. One of the groups expressing strong support
of H.R. 2707 was the American Bar Association. See Henry J. Reske and Mark Hanson, House
Reacts to Rust Decision, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1991, at 108. See also supra note 155.
170. H.R. 2707, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. (1991).
171. 137 CONG. REc. H5113 (daily ed. June 26, 1991) ("No funds shall be available under this
Act to enforce or otherwise implement the regulations of the Secretary of Health and Human Services
published at 42 C.F.R. 59.8 or to promulgate any other regulation having the same substance.").
Section 514 would not alter the regulations codified at 42 C.F.R. §§ 59.9 and 59.10. Thus, the
Department of Health and Human Services could still require physical and financial separation between
Title X and non-Title X institutions. Also, those institutions that provide a wide range of medical
services in addition to abortion could continue to receive funds. Those institutions that only provide
abortions would not be eligible to receive Title X funding. See infra note 177.
172. Laura L. Fritz, Bill to Revoke Ban on Abortion Counseling at Federally Funded Clinics
Advances, States News Service, Aug. 1, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
173. H.R. 3090, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
174. Id.
175. 137 CONG. REc. SI0,196 (daily ed. July 17, 1991) (passed by a voice vote).
176. S. 323, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
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the old regulations that dealt with abortion counseling. 177 The Senate
has also agreed to H.R. 2707 by a substantial vote. 78
The future of these efforts remains uncertain. President Bush
has threatened to veto all these pieces of legislation. 179 Whether the
House and Senate can override these promised vetoes remains a
question. The 353 to 74 House vote to deny funding for the en-
forcement of the counseling-ban regulation was in an appropriations
bill that a number of Representatives voted for because they sup-
ported everything in the bill save section 514's ban on enforcement
funding for the new regulations. 180 These Representatives are hoping
that the Congressional Conference Committee will eliminate section
514 from H.R. 2707.181 If not, they are committed to sustaining the
President's veto. 1
82
Equally questionable is the Senate's ability to override the Pres-
ident's threatened vetoes. The Senate passed S. 323 viva voce18 3 so
177. 137 CoNo. REc. S10,196-97 (daily ed. July 17, 1991) (S. 323 also contains a number of
provisions relating to parental notification for minors seeking abortions at Title X projects. The page
references cited above refer only to those sections of S. 323 codifying the pre-1988 regulations). As
in the case of § 514 of H.R. 2707, the regulations relating to the program integrity requirement and
the ban on encouraging, advocating, or promoting abortion would still be in force, as would the
funding ban on abortion-only clinics. 137 CONG. REc. 10,126 (daily ed. July 16, 1991) (statement by
Sen. Nickles). See supra note 171.
178. Gwen Ifill, Senate Votes Bill to Let Clinics Give Abortion Counsel, N.Y. TirEs, Sept. 13,
1991, at Al.
179. Major Garrett, Senate Votes to Quash Abortion-Advice Ban, WASH. Twnms, July 17, 1991,
at Al. During his administration, President Bush has successfully defended four vetoes on legislation
that allowed federal funds to be used for abortion related activities. Id. The abortion issue is a
consistent bone of contention between the President and the Congress. It is interesting to note that
this Presidential-Congressional conflict has a tendency to occur in the most unlikely arenas. See, e.g.,
Michael Ross, Senate Defies Veto Threat, Passes Foreign Aid Bill, 74-18, Los ANGELES TIMES, July
27, 1991, at A2 (discussing the House and Senate passage of foreign aid legislation that alters Bush
administration policy by reversing the Mexico City Policy, which forbids federal funding to assist
private family planning organizations operating overseas, and reauthorizes American participation in
the United Nations Population Fund); Helen Dewar, Senate Approves Foreign Aid Bill That Reverses
Antiabortion Policy, WASH. POST, July 27, 1991, at A13 (also discussing this legislation).
180. 137 CoNG. REC. H5123 (daily ed. June 26, 1991) (statement of Rep. Weber).
181. Id.
182. Id. At press time, the House had failed to override the President's veto by twelve votes.
See Kurt Shillinger, Win on Abortion Gives Bush Boost, CHISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 22, 1991,
at 7.
183. 137 CoNG. REc. S10,196 (daily ed. July 17, 1991) (voice vote on S. 323).
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an accurate tally of votes is impossible at this time. Other indi-
cations of the Senate's ability to override these possible vetoes are
also unavailing. While the Senate did pass H.R. 2707 by a veto
proof 78 to 22 vote, 184 the Senate has voted on two other pieces
of legislation relating directly to the regulations at issue in Rust
with less spectacular margins of victory.'8 5 The Senate rejected an
administration backed compromise bill on the counseling question
by a vote of 64 to 35 the day before it passed S. 323.186 The Senate
had also passed a measure similar to S. 323 in 1990 by a 62 to 34
vote.' 87 In both cases, the vote tally fell short of the 67 votes the
Senate needs to overturn the President's veto.' 88
VI. CONCLUSION
The decision of the Supreme Court in Rust v. Sullivan is un-
sound and deeply disturbing. The Supreme Court's zeal to ignore
basic and established canons of construction 89 indicates it is now
willing to violate traditional tenets of judicial restraint to impose
its personal sense of moral and political ideology upon the American
people. Furthermore, the substantive ramifications of the Rust de-
cision are even more disturbing. They have the potential to directly
and adversely affect all Americans.
Those most immediately affected are doctors and their patients.
Rust forces physicians into a "Hobson's choice": They face the
prospect of obeying the dictates of the new regulations and ignoring
their ethical duty and committing malpractice' 90 or ignoring the re-
184. Ifill, supra note 178, at Al.
185. See infra notes 186 & 187.
186. 137 CONG. REc. S10,103 (daily ed. July 16, 1991) (roll call vote on the Durenberger Amend-
ment).
187. 136 CONG. Rac. S13,792 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1990) (roll call vote on the Chafee amendment).
188. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (requiring a two-thirds vote to reverse a presidential veto).
189. Rust v. Sullivan, I11 S. Ct. 1759, 1778 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
190. Barbara Dolan et al., The Doctors Take on Bush, Tasm, Aug. 5, 1991, at 52-53. See also
Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct at 1785 n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted) (citing W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF ToRTs (5th ed. 1984)) (identifying that when
a doctor accepts a charity patient, that doctor is still liable for her failure to use all reasonable care
to protect that patient's interests).
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gulations and risking the loss of their desperately needed federal
funding. 191
Moreover, this type of governmental interference with the doc-
tor-patient relationship adversely affects a poor patient's health and
well-being in a very direct way. In the midst of serious illness and
injury, patients must now worry if their governmentally funded phy-
sician is basing his recommendations upon sound medical science
or political ideology.1
92
Further, the Supreme Court's reasoning in Rust is not necessarily
limited to the medical profession. This reasoning is equally appli-
cable to all advice-giving professionals. 193 For example, a court could
interpret the reasoning in Rust to allow the government to dictate
what advice a public defense lawyer may give a client. 94 Thus, the
Rust decision cannot help but erode those essential trust relation-
ships that must exist between governmentally funded advice-givers
and the poor Americans who depend upon their services everyday.
In so doing, Rust could easily destroy many excellent and worth-
191. The new regulations at issue in Rust were, at least partially, the result of the Bush ad-
ministration's opposition to abortion. See 42 C.F.R. § 59.2 (1989) ("Family Planning, as supported
under this subpart, should reduce the incidence of abortion."). See also supra notes 62-66 and ac-
companying text and supra note 179.
Paradoxically, by driving these Title X clinics out of operation, these new regulations could well
result in an increased number of unwanted pregnancies and, consequently, a dramatic rise in unsafe
and life threatening self-induced abortions. This outcome is exactly what resulted in Romania due to
former Premier Nicolae Ceaucescu's ban on contraception and abortions. Currently in Romania, the
dearth of contraceptives and family planning services has caused an inordinately large number of
women to undergo abortions because they lack the resources necessary to avoid pregnancy or care
for offspring.
In Romania, doctors usually perform three abortions for every live birth. This is almost the
opposite ratio of the United States and Western European nations. Chuck Sudetic, Romania Seeks
to Reduce Abortions, N.Y. Tnums, Jan. 17, 1991, at A3. See also Judy Mann, Gagging Women's
Clinics, WASH. PosT, May 29, 1991, at D3 (observing that the United States is twenty years behind
Western Europe in contraceptive research and has one of the highest nonintended pregnancy rates in
the world).
192. See Dolan, supra note 190, at 53 ("We are convinced that political medicine is harmful
to the health of all Americans.") (quoting American Medical Association Executive Vice President
James Todd).
193. Dangerous Gag, NAT'L L. J., Nov. 5, 1990, at 14.
194. See id. At its 113th annual convention, the American Bar Association's House of Delegates
unanimously voted to support Congressional efforts to overturn the Rust decision. See ABA Rejects
Ancillary Business, Inroads on Client Confidences, 60 U.S.L.W. 2121, 2123 (1991).
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while programs that are a hallmark of the government's commit-
ment to help its most isolated and vulnerable citizens.
Yet another disquieting result of Rust is that those who look
to the government for employment and assistance must now face
the prospect of choosing between their hard won constitutional rights
or their jobs and governmental benefits. The decision in Rust which
sanctions this governmental extortion is nothing less than the Su-
preme Court's stamp of approval on the old (and up to this de-
cision, discredited) 195 idea that when "you take the king's shilling,
you speak the king's language.'
1 96
The most chilling aspect of the Rust decision, however, is the
Court's implicit rejection of the foundation of American democratic
theory. The strength and vitality of the American system is drawn
from the willingness of its citizens to question every aspect of life
and to honestly and openly express their ideas and beliefs. 197 For
over two hundred years, our constitutional and political system has
rested upon the premise that through this continual and on-going
process, the American people would acquire the information they
needed to be able to make the correct choices for themselves. 98
This fundamental principle of democratic philosophy has nearly al-
ways assured' 99 that no one would ever consider governmental cen-
sorship of information sound public policy. 20° The Justices who voted
195. See Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1782 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("It is beyond ques-
tion 'that a government may not require an individual to relinquish rights guaranteed him by the
First Amendment as a condition of public employment."') (quoting Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ.,
431 U.S. 209, 234 (1977)) (citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 357-60 (1976) and cases cited therein).
See also 137 CONG. REc. H5124 (daily ed. June 26, 1991) (statement of Rep. Boxer) ("I thought we
had a revolution about that [i.e., governmentally compelled speech].").
196. 137 CONG. REc. H5124 (daily ed. June 26, 1991) (statement of Rep. Boxer).
197. Lapham, supra note 126, at 8.
198. See 137 CONG. REc. H5120 (daily ed. June 26, 1991) (statement of Rep. Johnson) ("Mr.
Chairman, democracy rests on two assumptions: First, that men and women are good, and second,
that given knowledge, they will do the right thing - they will act responsibly.").
199. This is not to say that other types of "gag-rules" have not existed in American history.
For example, between 1836 and 1844, the United States House of Representatives had parliamentary
rules that banned the House from accepting any petitions dealing with slavery. ALFRED H. KELLY ET
AL., THE AmRIcAN CoN srtloN: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 260-61 (6th ed. 1983).
200. See 137 CONG. REc. H5120 (daily ed. June 26, 1991) (statement of Rep. Johnson). See
also 137 CONG. REc. H5125 (daily ed. June 26, 1991) (statement of Rep. Matsui) ("It is contrary to
the values of our society to deny individuals information necessary in order to make a well thought
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in the majority in Rust voted for nothing less than the subversion
of this most basic and vital premise of the American experience.
They would have done well to remember the eloquent and prophetic
words of Montesquieu: "The deterioration of every government be-
gins with the decay of the principles on which it was founded." '20'
Scott E. Johnson*
out decision."). For a discussion of government funding and free speech considerations, see generally
Georges Nahitchevansky, Note, Free Speech and Government Funding: Does the Government Have
to Fund What It Doesn't Like?, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 213 (1990).
201. Quoted in Lapham, supra note 126, at 6.
* The author of this comment wishes to thank Dr. Victoria D. List, Esquire, of Washington
& Jefferson College, Dr. Gerald M. Pops, Esquire, of West Virginia University and Mr. Bernard J.
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